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This paper examines the link between price regulation and pharmaceutical research and 
development (R&D) investment.  I identify two mechanisms through which price regulation (or 
re-importation) may exert an influence on R&D: an expected-profit effect and a cash-flow effect.  
Using established models of the determinants of pharmaceutical R&D, I exploit a unique fact to 
quantify firm exposure to pharmaceutical price regulation: relative to the rest of the world, the 
U.S. pharmaceutical market is largely unregulated with respect to price.  Using this fact within 
the context of a system of quasi-structural equations, I simulate how a new policy regulating 
pharmaceutical prices in the U.S. will affect R&D investment. I find that such a policy will lead 
to a decline in industry R&D by between 23.4 and 32.7 percent.  This prediction, however, is 
accompanied by several caveats.  Moreover, it says nothing about the implications for social 
welfare; therefore, these issues are also discussed. 
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Examining the Link Between Price Regulation, Reimportation,  
and Pharmaceutical R&D Investment 
 




In this paper I examine a potential link between price regulation and investment in 
pharmaceutical research and development (R&D).  Because it is through R&D that new drugs 
are discovered and brought to market, it is important to understand what effect, if any, price 
regulation has on a firm’s decision to allocate resources to this activity.  I describe two potential 
channels through which price regulation may exert an influence on R&D investment.  First, price 
regulation may affect the expected returns to R&D, which may be thought of as a demand-side 
effect (for R&D).  Second, if capital market imperfections exist in the market for R&D finance 
(and impart a lower cost of capital to internal funds relative to external debt and equity), then 
price regulation may also affect R&D through a cash flow effect (i.e., a supply-of-funds effect).   
To quantify pharmaceutical price regulation in this paper I will utilize a unique stylized 
fact: relative to the rest of the world, the U.S. pharmaceutical market is largely unregulated with 
respect to price.  Methods of pharmaceutical price regulation outside the U.S. are quite 
heterogeneous, and include, for example, direct price regulation through price controls (e.g. 
France and Italy), indirect price regulation through limits on reimbursement under social 
insurance programs (e.g. Germany and Japan), and indirect price regulation through profit 
controls (e.g. the United Kingdom)
1.  Therefore, firms with a high proportion of their 
pharmaceutical sales coming from non-U.S. markets will be more exposed to price regulation 
than firms whose sales come primarily from the U.S. market.  This fact will play a key role 
inidentifying the potential links between price regulation, pharmaceutical profitability, firm cash 
flows, and R&D investment. 
This article will proceed as follows.  Section Two will present the theory and define a 
system of quasi-structural equations that govern the firm R&D investment process.  This will be 
done within the context of two broadly classified markets: a price-regulated market (i.e., non-
U.S. pharmaceutical markets) and a “free” market (i.e., the largely unregulated—with respect to   2
price—U.S. market).  I will rely heavily on the prior research by Grabowski and Vernon [3-6], 
which has established a robust empirical framework for analyzing the determinants of 
pharmaceutical R&D investment intensity.  Section Three will describe the various data sets used 
and discuss my empirical results.  Following this, Section Four will simulate a policy of 
introducing price regulation into the U.S. pharmaceutical market.  I will model this by assuming 
price regulation (or re-importation) drives U.S. pharmaceutical profit margins down to the 
average level observed in non-U.S. pharmaceutical markets.  This, I will argue, will reduce both 
future pharmaceutical profit expectations and firm cash flows.  Potential welfare implications 
will also be considered in this section.  Section Five will conclude.  
 
2. Theory and Empirical Specifications 
 
Basic economic theory predicts that firms invest in capital up to the point where the 
expected marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) is just equal to the firm’s marginal cost of 
capital (MCC).  This equilibrium may be thought of in the classic way: as the intersection of a 
demand (for investment) and supply curve (for investment funds).   
A firm’s MEI schedule is derived by arranging potential investment projects in a 
decreasing order with respect to each project’s risk-adjusted expected rate of return.  Firms will 
undertake the most profitable investment projects firstthose offering the highest risk-adjusted 
expected rate of return—and continue to undertake additional investment projects so long as the 
expected rate of return from the next project exceeds the firm’s marginal cost of capital.  This 
classic supply and demand framework for capital investment may be applied directly to 
investment in pharmaceutical R&D.   
The MCC reflects the supply price of funds on the margin.   In a neoclassical world, with 
perfect information and well-functioning capital markets, the MCC schedule would be constant 
at the real market rate of interest, implying that firms consider the source of investment finance 
irrelevant [7].  Recent research, however, both theoretical and empirical, suggests the source of 
finance does matter, and cash flows, because they have a lower cost of capital relative to external 
                                                                                                                                                             
1.  For a detailed summary of the different methods of pharmaceutical price regulation around the world, the reader 
is referred to Danzon’s recent work [1,2].   3
debt and equity, exert a positive influence on firm investment spending [8-10]
2.   Grabowski and 
Vernon [12-15] have demonstrated this to be particularly true for pharmaceutical R&D 
investment.   
Therefore, mathematically, a pharmaceutical firm’s equilibrium level of R&D investment 
may be described by the following optimality condition:   
 
MEI (RD, X) = MCC (RD, Y)                                (1)   
                         
In equation (1), X is a vector of variables influencing the expected returns to R&D investment 
(i.e., the demand for R&D) and Y is a vector of variables influencing the opportunity cost of 
investment capital (i.e., the supply price of funds); RD is, of course, the firm’s level of R&D 
investment.  Solving equation (1) for RD yields the following reduced-form solution for a firm’s 
equilibrium level of R&D investment: 
 
RD
* = f (X, Y)                                             (2) 
         
In their most recent study of the determinants of pharmaceutical R&D expenditures, 
Grabowski and Vernon [16] analyzed panel data for eleven firms from 1974 to 1994.  They 
found pharmaceutical profit expectations and cash flows to be the principal explanatory variables 
of firm-level R&D investment.  This finding was consistent with their earlier studies, which 
examined different time periods and firms.  Grabowski and Vernon’s general empirical 





























                                                 
2 Arguments for expecting a divergence in the cost of internal and external finance have been based on transactions 
costs, tax advantages, asymmetric information, agency costs, and the costs of financial distress.  Hubbard [11] 
provides a review of these arguments.    4
The variables in equation (3) are defined as follows: 
 
it R      =   firm i’s R&D expenditures in year t; 
it S      =   firm i’s total sales in year t; 
t Eπ    =   an index of the expected returns to pharmaceutical R&D in year t; 
1 − it C   =   firm i’s cash flow in year t-1; 
i F      =    a dummy variable for firm i (for i = 2 to 11). 
   
While a detailed review of their model is not necessary for the purposes of this research, 
one important characteristic of the model does deserve attention because of its relevance to the 
current analyses.  Grabowski and Vernon utilized an industry-wide proxy of the expected returns 
to pharmaceutical R&D
3.  This is in contrast to their earlier studies in which they employed firm-
level proxies of expected returns
4.  While their industry-wide variable was statistically 
significant, the fact that it was measured at the industry level—and not the firm level—could be 
problematic.  This would be the case if there existed heterogeneity in firm pharmaceutical profit 
expectations.  Grabowski and Vernon argued that parallel paths of research and increasing R&D 
spillover opportunities, which began in the early 1980’s [19,20], would tend to result in uniform 
pharmaceutical profit expectations within the industry.  While this is not implausible, it seems 
more likely that firms will have different expectations about their future pharmaceutical 
profitability.  Indeed, as Vernon [21,22] has discussed, some firms consistently profit more than 
others from their R&D activities, and they do this by being more successful at penetrating the 
highly profitable U.S. pharmaceutical marketplace: the only marketplace that remains largely 
unregulated with respect to price
5.  The obvious question then becomes: why are some firms 
better than others at infiltrating the U.S. market?  One plausible explanation is that firms have 
                                                 
3 In fact, they formulated and tested two proxies for expected returns: pre-tax pharmaceutical profit margins and an 
index of R&D productivity (defined as a moving average of new pharmaceutical product sales divided by lagged 
R&D expenditures).   
4 In their earlier studies Grabowski and Vernon [17,18] employed a moving average of a firm’s newly launched 
pharmaceutical sales divided by lagged R&D expenditures, which they found to be significant at normal confidence 
levels.  
5 Vernon [23] has estimated that pre-tax pharmaceutical profit margins in the U.S. are on the magnitude of four to 
five times higher than those observed, on average, outside the U.S., and there was relatively little variability in the 
share of a firm’s pharmaceutical sales coming from the U.S. market during the 1990s (the decade for which these 
data were available).     5
divergent capabilities in discovering, developing, and marketing pharmaceutical products for the 
U.S. market
6.  Indeed, this is what Grabowski and Vernon assumed in their earlier studies when 
they utilized firm-level measures of pharmaceutical profitability and productivity to proxy for 
expected future returns to R&D.  The theoretical arguments for the existence of sustainable 
heterogeneities in firm capabilities (e.g. R&D capabilities) are numerous, and have their origins 
in the resource-based theory of the firm [26,27].  In addition to firm capabilities, intra-industry 
barriers to entry, such as trademarks, goodwill, and advertising might also contribute to a 
sustained divergence across firms with respect to their abilities to develop commercially 
successful pharmaceuticals (which significantly penetrate the U.S market).  
Therefore, in forthcoming analyses of how price regulation affects R&D investment, I 
will employ a firm-level proxy of pharmaceutical profit expectations—one that is identical to 
Grabowski and Vernon’s industry-level variable.  I will use a firm’s  current period pre-tax 
pharmaceutical profit margin to proxy expected future profitability
7.  More will be said about 
this variable momentarily.  The key question now becomes how, within this model of firm R&D 
investment, does pharmaceutical price regulation enter? This question is addressed next. 
 
The Link Between Pharmaceutical Price Regulation and Firm R&D Investment 
It has been widely argued in the literature that pharmaceutical price regulation exerts a 
negative influence on a firm’s expected returns to R&D investment (see, for example, Scherer 
[30]; Grabowski [31]; Helms [32]; Green [33]; and Vernon [34])
8.  Within the framework of the 
                                                 
6 A related interpretation would be that truly exceptional drugs become blockbusters (which significantly penetrate 
the U.S. market), and current margins reflect past success in developing blockbusters; thus, current margins may 
serve as a reasonable proxy for a firm’s expectations about its ability to develop blockbusters in the future, and it 
R&D productivity more generally. This interpretation is also consistent with Grabowski and Vernon’s logic [24, 25].  
7 Lichtenberg [28] has criticized this approach and, specifically, Scherer’s [29] suggestion that current margins are 
likely to be an important determinant of pharmaceutical R&D investment. Lichtenberg argues that firm market 
capitalizations, which should reflect the present value of the firm’s expected future profits, are a more forward-
looking measure of the expected returns to pharmaceutical R&D.  This is likely to be true if markets are perfectly 
functioning and if the firm operates exclusively within the pharmaceutical industry.  However, many of the firms in 
my sample, and indeed many of the firms in the pharmaceutical industry, are diversified across multiple industries 
and business operations; therefore, their market capitalizations should reflect the present value of expected future 
profits from all business operations, and not just pharmaceuticals (and pharmaceutical R&D more specifically).  
However, I did find a positive correlation between current pharmaceutical profit margins and various measures of 
firm market capitalization, and for firms that operated almost exclusively within the pharmaceutical business, this 
correlation was quite high (ρ =0.76). 
8 Indeed, this is the primary argument put forth by most opponents to the regulation of prescription drug prices in the 
U.S.  The standard argument maintains that the unregulated U.S. pharmaceutical market (with respect to prices) 
supports industry-wide R&D incentives.   6
model just described, this regulatory influence will reduce the demand for R&D through the X 
vector in the MEI equation.  Theoretically this seems appropriate because a firm’s returns to 
R&D come in large part from sales of newly launched, patented, pharmaceuticals—those 
products for which price regulation is the most stringent in non-U.S. markets [35]. Therefore, the 
greater the proportion of a firm’s pharmaceutical sales coming from outside the U.S., the greater 
a firm’s exposure to price regulation, and, importantly, the lower a firm’s expected returns to 
R&D, ceteris paribus.    
The second principal way in which pharmaceutical price regulation may influence firm 
R&D investment is through a cash-flow effect.  Unlike profit expectations, which operate 
through the X vector in equation (2), and are based on forward-looking expectations, this 
influence will occur through the Y vector, and the firm’s level of internally generated funds.  The 
former influence may be thought of as a demand-side effect (for R&D investment) and the latter 
a supply-side effect (for investment funds).  Figure 1 illustrates these two effects within the 
context of preceding discussion. 
Regarding Figure 1, there is an important point to keep in mind: firms in the 
pharmaceutical industry are often highly diversified into other industries (e.g. consumer 
products, medical devices, and industrial chemicals).  As such, a firm’s cash flow will be 
determined by both its pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical business operations.  This 
distinction is highlighted in the following system of quasi-structural equations that define the 
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The new variables appearing in equations (4)-(7) are the following: 
 
it π    = firm i’s pre-tax pharmaceutical profits in year t; 
1
~
− πit  = firm i’s pre-tax non-pharmaceutical profits in year t;  
P
it S   = firm i’s total pharmaceutical sales in year t; 
it λ    = the percentage of firm i’s pharmaceutical sales in year t from non-U.S. markets;  
F
it M  = firm i’s average pre-tax profit margin on pharmaceuticals products  
sold in the U.S. market in year t; 
R
it M  = firm i’s average pre-tax profit margin on pharmaceuticals products  
sold in non-U.S. markets in year t; 
1 − it I   = firm i’s net income in year t-1; 
1 − it D  = firm i’s depreciation expense in year t-1; 
τ      = the corporate tax rate. 
 
The first equation is the firm R&D investment equation.  It is similar in specification to 
the formulation used by Grabowski and Vernon in their most recent study; however, as was 
previously mentioned, the industry-wide proxy for expected returns to R&D has been replaced. 
An equivalent firm-level version of this variable is used instead
9. 
Equation (5) is an identity, and reflects the fact that a firm’s pre-tax pharmaceutical profit 
margin can be decomposed into a weighted average of its pre-tax pharmaceutical profit margin in 
the U.S. and its pre-tax pharmaceutical profit margin in non-U.S. markets
10. This decomposition 
is derived and discussed in the appendix. 
Equation (6) is also an identity, and defines how the cash flow variable was constructed 
for this study.  Following Grabowski and Vernon [37] and Hall [38], this definition was designed 
to measure a firm’s internally generated funds before the payment of dividends and investment in 
R&D and other capital assets.  Because R&D, unlike other capital assets, is expensed for tax 
purposes, after-tax R&D was added to after-tax net income and depreciation to obtain an 
estimate of a firm’s pre-investment cash flow.  A flat tax rate of 33 percent was used for this 
                                                 
9 Industry-wide controls for changing profit expectations (i.e., year fixed effects) were also included, but these 
variables are repressed in equation (4) for simplicity. Indeed, as will be discussed in the next section, several 
specifications of equation (4) were estimated and modeled within the system of equations shown in (4)-(7). 
10 Following Vernon [36], the superscripts F and R are used, thus drawing the distinction between the largely price-
unregulated U.S. market (i.e., “free” market) and the price-regulated pharmaceutical markets around the world.   8
purpose
11.  Lastly, equation (7) reflects the fact that a firm’s net income is the sum of its after-tax 
pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical profits. 
The main equation estimated in this paper will be the R&D equation.  However, in order 
to demonstrate how price regulation (or possibly re-importation) influences R&D investment, 
equations (5)-(7) must also considered.  Therefore, repeated substitution and lagging are used to 
obtain an expanded version of the R&D equation, which contains λ, a measure of exposure to 
pharmaceutical price regulation
12. 
Equation (7) is first substituted into equation (6) to yield the following form of the lagged 
cash flow variable: 
 
1 1 1 1 1 ) ~ )( 1 ( − − − − − + + + − = it it it it it D R C π π τ                             (8) 
 
Next, equation (5) is lagged one period, multiplied through by 
P
it S 1 − , and substituted into (8) to 
produce the following expanded version of lagged cash flow: 
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Finally, equations (5) and (9) are substituted into equation (4).  This results in a fully 
decomposed version of the R&D equation, one that is a function of λ (firm constant terms have 
been suppressed for algebraic convenience):  
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11 This follows Grabowski and Vernon’s approach in their most recent study. 
12 As will be discussed more fully in a forthcoming section, and as Vernon [39] and Berndt [40] have discussed, 
there are likely to be several factors that contribute to the divergence in pharmaceutical prices (and profit margins) 
across U.S. and non-U.S. markets; however, it seems likely that price regulation is a prominent factor.  Moreover, in 
the forthcoming simulation, all that is assumed is that price regulation (or allowing for the re-importation of 
pharmaceuticals from outside the U.S.) results in U.S. pharmaceutical profit margins being driven down to the 
average level observed in non-U.S. markets. This seems to be a reasonable assumption.   9
          
Equation (10) reveals the precise nature of the linkages between pharmaceutical price 
regulation and investment in R&D (at least within the context of the model described by 
equations (4) through (7)).  The first term is the expected-profitability effect, which enters the 
model contemporaneously
13. The second term is the cash flow effect, which influences R&D 
intensity with a one-period lag.  Before proceeding to the empirical section of this paper, an 
interesting policy scenario is considered within the context of equation (10).   
 
Regulating Pharmaceutical Prices in the United States? 
There has been much debate over whether or not the U.S., like the rest of the world, 
should begin regulating pharmaceutical prices.  In fact, there have been several attempts to pass 
into law bills that would result in regulated pharmaceutical prices in the U.S.  For example, the 
1993 Health Security Act proposed by the Clinton Administration called for universal health 
insurance with price-regulated pharmaceuticals as part of the basic benefit package.  In more 
recent times, however, individual states have begun filing bills that would enable state 
legislatures to set maximum prices for prescription drugs
14.   Similarly, the re-importation of 
pharmaceuticals from Canada and Europe has emerged as another potential means of curtailing 
prices in the U.S.
15  
Within the context of equation (10), a scenario of regulated pharmaceutical prices in the 
U.S. can in fact be modeled.  This is possible because of the way price regulation is measured in 
the model: as the percentage of a firm’s pharmaceutical sales coming from price-regulated (i.e., 
non-U.S.) markets.  Consequently, if pharmaceutical prices in the U.S. were regulated in a 
manner equivalent to the average degree of price regulation found in non-U.S. markets, within 
                                                 
13 As already discussed, the implicit assumption here is that contemporaneous pharmaceutical profit margins serve 
as a reasonably good proxy for expected future pharmaceutical profit margins, and profitability more generally 
(refer to footnote 7).  
14 For example, in May of 2000, the state of Maine passed Bills S1026 and LD2599 into law, thus establishing 
discounted prices for all Maine residents without prescription drug coverage.   
15 The issue of re-importation is not new.  In fact, prior bills allowing re-importation were passed into law as early as 
2000.  However, these laws contain a provision requiring the Secretary of Health and Human Services certify that 
imported drugs will pose "no additional risk" to consumers (NY Times, July 21, 2003). So far neither the Clinton nor 
Bush Administrations have been willing endorse such a claim. Thus, re-importation has remained illegal in the 
United States.  However, the currently debated re-importation bill, HR 335, which was approved by the U.S. House 
of Representatives on July 24, 2003, contains no such “poison pill” provision.   10
equation (10) this would be equivalent to setting  1 = λ : all of a firm’s pharmaceutical sales are 
subjected to price regulation of one form or another.   
Mathematically, this scenario can be modeled as the limit of the R&D investment 
equation as both  it λ and  1 − it λ  approach unity.  This limit is evaluated one year after the 
hypothetical policy is enacted because the cash flow effect operates with a one-year lag (again, 
firm constant terms are suppressed for convenience)
16.   
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         ∆ Pharmaceutical Profit Margin                           ∆ Cash Flows 
 
In order to evaluate equation (12), it is necessary to have parameter estimates of  1 β , 2 β , 
and average pre-tax pharmaceutical profit margins in both markets.  Data on the other model 
variables may be obtained directly from firm financial statements and/or other sources.  These 
parameters will be estimated in the following two sections.  To be certain, this type of policy 
simulation is highly speculative, and any predictions that are generated need to be tempered with 
considerable caution for a number of reasons.  Nevertheless, this is what is done in Section 4, 
                                                 
16 Clearly, only the profit effect would occur contemporaneously with the policy change.  This highlights a 
significant limitation in the policy simulation exercise presented here: it implicitly assumes that the new policy is 
enacted without warning, and that firms did not foresee the new policy coming.  This is indeed a dubious 
assumption: a major policy change of the magnitude described here would certainly be seen coming in advance 
(possibly a year or more in advance).  Thus, for example, if current pharmaceutical margins are “high,” this period, 
but it is anticipated that U.S. pharmaceutical prices will be regulated next year, contemporaneous profit margins will 
“overstate” future profit expectations.  
17 The constant terms are not suppressed in equation (12).  Rather, like the other terms not interacting withλ , they 
simply drop out through differencing.  Also note that, unlike the brackets underneath equation (10), the brackets 
beneath equation (12) are exclusive of the slope coefficients  1 β and  2 β .   11
along with a discussion of the caveats involved.  First, however, empirical models of the 
determinants of R&D intensity will be estimated.  This is done next using firm financial data on 
fourteen major pharmaceutical firms from 1994 to 1997.  
 
3. Data and Empirical Estimates of the Determinants of R&D Investment 
 
Financial data on the world’s 30 largest pharmaceutical firms from 1994 to 1997 were 
collected from three primary sources: Standard & Poor Compustat files, Scrip Company League 
Tables (PJB Publications Ltd) and IMS America.  The sample was restricted to top-30 firms to 
ensure that the selected firms had a specialization in innovative R&D.  Several firms that ranked 
below 30, but above 50, were generic manufacturing drug firms (e.g. Watson and Mylan), which 
perform little, if any, innovative R&D.  The sample time period was selected because of data 
availability for several of the model’s key variables and merger activity
18.  These issues are 
discussed next. 
Of the top-30 firms for which data were collected, complete observations (on all of the 
key model variables) were available for only 14 firms.  There were two principal reasons for why 
some top-30 firms had to be excluded from the sample.  First, if a firm experienced a merger 
during or after the sample time period, historical financial data prior to the merger could not 
always be reconstructed.  This was because of the different reporting methodologies used by the 
three data sources.  For example, IMS pools the financial histories of merged firms.  Standard 
and Poor, on the other hand, assigns to the new firm the financial history of the larger of the two 
firms pre-merger.  Only Scrip maintains records on the separate firms pre-merger.  The second 
reason some firms were excluded from the sample was lack of data on firm pharmaceutical 
profitability.  Most firms in the pharmaceutical industry are diversified into other, non-
pharmaceutical industries; thus, a firm’s total profit is comprised of both pharmaceutical and 
non-pharmaceutical business operations.  Unlike a firm’s total profits, pharmaceutical profits (or 
the profits generated by other business lines) are seldom reported in firm financial statements.  
Scrip, on the other hand, does report these data.  However, because these data are based on 
                                                 
18 There were a number of mergers taking place in the pharmaceutical industry in the late 1990’s. The window from 
1994 to 1997 provided the best opportunity for collecting a balanced panel dataset.  Furthermore, Scrip altered the 
type of pharmaceutical profit data it collected in 1994: it switched from collecting after-tax pharmaceutical profits to 
pre-tax pharmaceutical operating profits.     12
survey responses (i.e., firms are not required to report these data), pharmaceutical profitability 
for several firms could not be obtained
19.   
 
Empirical Analyses: The Determinants of Pharmaceutical R&D Investment 
To estimate the R&D investment equation from the last section, current-period 
pharmaceutical profit margins were used to proxy a firm’s expected future pharmaceutical 
profitability.  As previously argued, this variable should serve as a reasonable proxy for a firm’s 
expectations per its ability to discover, develop, and market commercially successful 
pharmaceutical products (which typically penetrate the U.S. market in a significant manner). 
Because the data sample was constructed from a panel of fourteen firms over only four 
years, it was a concern that the firm fixed-effects specification might obfuscate some of the key 
behavior relationships this paper seeks to identify
20.  Indeed, most of the sample variation in the 
dependent and independent variables occurred across firms, and not within firms over time.  As a 
result, two other general model specifications were estimated: an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
specification and a random-effects specification.  Table 1 summarizes the empirical results from 
these three regression equations
21.   
Consistent with earlier research, the results in Table 1 suggest that both pharmaceutical 
profit expectations and lagged cash flows are important determinants of firm R&D intensity.  
The cash flow coefficient, which was significant at the 0.05-level or better in every equation, was 
found to be remarkably similar in magnitude to the coefficients obtained in earlier studies 
(studies that examined different time periods and different firms).  Specifically, in the current 
study this coefficient ranged from 0.11 to 0.29 (compared to a range of 0.12 to 0.31 obtained in 
                                                 
19 It is important to note that there did not appear to be any systematic reason why some firms reported these data in 
some years but not in others (or not at all). Some firms reported firm-wide profit margins exclusively.  Moreover, 
when possible, data validity checks were performed on the Scrip data (i.e., by comparing the Scrip data to the same 
data reported by other sources—this could be done for firms that were not diversified outside of pharmaceuticals 
because total firm data is then identical to firm pharmaceutical data.  These validity checks suggested that the Scrip 
data were reliable.  The Scrip data (those reported at the firm level) were also found to be consistent with other data 
sources (e.g. total firm sales). 
20 As Hsiao [41] states: “When only a few observations are available for different [firms] over time, it is 
exceptionally important to make the most efficient use of the data across [firms] to estimate that part of the 
behavioral relationship containing variables that differ from one [firm] to another. 
21 In additional to year fixed effects, an additional control was also employed: the ratio of a firm’s pharmaceutical 
sales to its total sales.  This control was used in several of Grabowski and Vernon’s earlier studies [42,43] to control 
for the fact that firms have other, not insignificant research and development activities outside of pharmaceuticals, 
and firms that are more concentrated in pharmaceuticals will, all else held constant, have higher R&D intensities due   13
previous studies).  The variable designed to capture expected future pharmaceutical profitability 
(i.e., contemporaneous pharmaceutical profit margins) also performed well from a statistical 
perspective, and was similarly significant at the 0.05-level or better in every equation.  However, 
the coefficient range for this variable, unlike that for the lagged cash flow variable, was quite 
narrow, and ranged from only 0.06 to 0.07
22.   
As discussed previously, given the short time series in the current panel, and the fact that 
most of the sample variation in the dependent and independent variables occurred across firms 
and not over time, a firm fixed-effects specification comes at a very high cost: it uses up fourteen 
degrees of freedom (25% of the data sample).  Thus, it may obscure the influence cash flows and 
profit expectations have on R&D investment by not fully exploiting the variations in these 
variables across firms
23.  Indeed, the coefficients on the cash flow variable and profit 
expectations variable are smaller in the fixed-effects models relative to the OLS and random-
effects models.  This suggests that the firm fixed-effects are picking up some of the time-
invariant variation across firms in these explanatory variables.  Before proceeding, however, it is 
necessary to mention that the random-effects specification is appropriate only if the firm effects 
are uncorrelated with the other model regressors.  If they are correlated, then the random-effects 
model may suffer from inconsistency due to omitted variables.  Therefore, a Hausman [44] test 
was performed.  The null hypothesis of orthogonality between the random effects and other 
model regressors could not be rejected (W=4.88).  For this reason, the fixed-effects model results 





                                                                                                                                                             
to pharmaceuticals being among the most research intensive industries in the world.  Using firm fixed-effects 
overcomes the need for this control variable (this variable was statistically insignificant in the fixed-effects model) 
22 Models were also estimated using  it λ explicitly as a determinant of R&D intensity.  This was done because 
pharmaceutical price regulation, which often results in significant marketing delays [45], could alter the cash-flow 
profiles of new products in a manner not captured by a firm’s current period pharmaceutical profit margin [46].  
These regression results found  it λ and current-period pharmaceutical profit margins to be fairly substitutable. 
23 Refer to the point made in footnote 20. 
24 A fixed-effects specification was more reasonable in the Grabowski and Vernon [48] study because the authors 
were working with a 21-year time series.  Grabowski [49] similarly did not employ firm fixed-effects; his sample 
also contained only 4 years of data (for 10 pharmaceutical firms)   14
4. Pharmaceutical Price Regulation in the United States: Potential Consequences for 
Industry R&D Investment 
 
As described in detail in Section 2, it is possible to simulate, within the context of the 
R&D models estimated above, how a new policy regulating pharmaceutical prices in the U.S. 
might impact R&D investment.  This was demonstrated mathematically by equation (12) in 
Section 2.  Before evaluating equation (12), however, it is first necessary to estimate equation 
(5), which is used to obtain measures of the average pre-tax pharmaceutical profit margins in 
U.S. and non-U.S. markets (i.e., in price-regulated and non-price-regulated markets).  Vernon 
[47] has done this using a similar data sample, and determined that pre-tax pharmaceutical profit 
margins in the U.S. are approximately four times as large as those, on average, in non-U.S. 
markets (0.43 versus 0.12 in the most directly comparable sample). While there are certainly 
other factors that may be contributing to this observed difference (e.g., third degree price 
discrimination and medical practices), it seems likely that price regulation is indeed a prominent 
factor
25.   As will be seen momentarily, it is through the link between price regulation and pre-
tax pharmaceutical profit margins that this policy experiment will be modeled.  Therefore, 
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Using data on the variables  it π , 
P
it S , and  it λ from the current sample, equation (14) was used to 





respectively.  Specifically, the following equation was estimated: 
 
                                                 







1 0 − =                                 (15) 
 
The constant term ( 0 α ) may be interpreted as the average pre-tax pharmaceutical profit 
margin in the U.S., and this constant term less the slope coefficient ( 1 0 α − α ) may be interpreted 
as the average pre-tax pharmaceutical profit margin in non-U.S. markets.  The appendix provides 
a detailed derivation of the theoretical model underlying this empirical specification.  Table 2 
summarizes the regression results from three separate statistical models: OLS, firm fixed effects, 
and firm random effects.  The corresponding estimates of average pre-tax pharmaceutical 
margins are also reported.   
The results from the three models are highly consistent with one another, and suggest that 
average pre-tax pharmaceutical profit margins are roughly four to five times higher in the U.S 
than they are in markets outside the U.S.  Not surprisingly, in the fixed-effects model, the 
coefficient on  it λ  was only marginally statistically significant (p=0.064) relative to the 
significance levels obtained from the random effects and OLS models (p< 0.001).  However, as 
Table 2 shows, the coefficient estimates from the fixed-effects model were very similar to those 
found in the OLS and random-effects models. 
To further investigate the linkage between price regulation and pharmaceutical profit 
margins, equation (14) was also estimated by OLS for each year in the sample.  The results from 
these regressions were very similar to the pooled results, and both the intercept ( 0 ˆ α ) and slope 
coefficient ( 1 ˆ α ) were significant at the 0.001-level or better in each regression.  The results from 
these single-year regressions are reported in the appendix. 
The findings just presented may now be used in conjunction with the empirical work 
from Section 3 to model the potential consequences of regulating prescription drug prices in the 
U.S.   
 
Simulating the Effects of a New U.S. Policy on Pharmaceuticals  
Within the framework of the theoretical model described by equations (4) through (7), the 
effect of regulating pharmaceutical prices in the U.S. can be illustrated by first evaluating the 
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Equation (16) captures firm i’s pre-tax pharmaceutical profit margin under the new U.S. 
policy in year t, and highlights the central mechanism through which this policy simulation 
models the effect of price regulation on R&D investment: by driving a firm’s average 
pharmaceutical profit margin down to the average level found in non-U.S. markets
26.  In other 
words, the assumption is that the new policy will cause U.S. pharmaceutical prices to be 
regulated in such a manner as to make U.S pharmaceutical profit margins equal, on average, to 
non-U.S. pharmaceutical profit margins.  A new law legalizing the re-importation of 
pharmaceuticals into the U.S. would plausibly satisfy this requirement
27.  It is critical to note, 
however, that to the extent that other factors contribute to the observed divergence in pre-tax 
pharmaceutical profit margins across U.S. and non-U.S. markets, the forthcoming policy 
simulation might overstate the effect of price regulation in the U.S.  Therefore, this policy 
simulation is really an analysis of how lowering pharmaceutical profit margins in the U.S., to the 
average level found in non-U.S. markets, will impact investment in R&D.  This being said, 
however, as Vernon [49] has argued, it is quite likely that pharmaceutical price regulation is the 
prominent factor responsible for the observed divergence in profit margins across U.S. and non-
U.S. markets.    
Using the parameter estimates obtained from the random-effects and OLS model 
specifications in Sections 3 and 4 (i.e., models E.1, E.2, E.4, and E.5), equation (12) from 
Section 2 was evaluated at the industry level.  This was accomplished by using sample means of 
the relevant model variable.
28  These forecasts are summarized in Tables 3. 
The results in Table 3 suggest that regulating pharmaceutical prices in the U.S. could lead 
to a decline in R&D intensity of between 23.4 and 32.7 percent (from 0.107 to between 0.082 
                                                 
26 Equation (16) depicts the specific case for firm i in year t.  In the forthcoming simulation exercises, however, 
sample means will be employed to estimate the average industry response to price regulation in the U.S.; in this 
context, 
R M  is the appropriate limiting value. 
27 In fact, this is precisely what is currently being debated in Washington, D.C.  The re-importation bill, H.R. 2427, 
which was approved by the House of Representatives on July 24, 2003, would allow for the importation of 
pharmaceuticals from 26 countries.  The U.S. Senate has yet to vote on this bill. 
28 Full descriptive statistics are reported in the appendix.   17
and 0.072).  Of this total decline in R&D, the cash flow effect accounts for between 44 and 60 
percent of this drop, and the expected profit effect accounts for between 56 and 40 percent, 
depending on the model specification employed. This prediction is necessarily speculative for a 
couple of reasons.  First, it implicitly assumes that the new policy will result in U.S. profit 
margins falling to the level of profit margins in markets outside the U.S.  As has already been 
stated, it is likely that other factors—besides price regulation—may influence pharmaceutical 
profitability.  Therefore, the estimates reported in Table 4 could simply represent a lower bound 
on the decline in R&D that would accompany pharmaceutical price regulation in the U.S.   
However, given that price regulation is likely to be the prominent factor responsible for the 
divergence in pharmaceutical profit margins across U.S. and non-U.S. markets, this 
approximation may be quite reasonable.  This would be particularly true if the policy under 
consideration is the re-importation of pharmaceuticals from non-U.S. markets at the prices for 
which those products are being sold at abroad.  
A second reason these estimates are tenuous is because they are based on a significant 
deviation away from the sample (industry) average.  The mean of  it λ  in the sample was 0.494; 
the policy simulation assumed this value was driven to unity. As a result, average firm profit 
margins were reduced from 0.303 to 0.105 in the simulations.  Perturbations of this magnitude, 
for predictive purposes, may be inappropriate.  There is no way to know if these models will 
continue to characterize industry conduct and performance under such circumstances. 
These findings, while necessarily speculative, do appear to be highly plausible, and in 
accordance with economic theory.  However, identifying the links between price regulation and 
R&D is of only limited value from a social welfare perspective.  For example, to address how the 
regulation of pharmaceutical prices in the U.S. will impact social welfare, several additional 
considerations need to be examined.  While this is beyond the scope of the current analyses, 
these considerations will be briefly mentioned. 
 
What Would the Regulation of U.S. Pharmaceutical Prices Mean for Social Welfare? 
There are two interrelated issues that determine how pharmaceutical price regulation in 
the U.S. would affect social welfare.  The first deals with the production function for 
pharmaceutical innovation, and the second, which is related to the first, deals with the tradeoff   18
between static and dynamic efficiency.  To illustrate the importance of the first issue, Figure 2 
considers two simple industry production functions for pharmaceutical innovation
29.   
The shape of the innovation production function (over the range of R&D investment 
levels pre- and post-policy change) is critical in determining the consequences for 
pharmaceutical innovation that would be associated with regulating drug prices in the U.S.  If 
there is a “low” marginal productivity associated with R&D (at the current, pre-policy level of 
investment), as illustrated by production function g, then the fall in R&D associated with price 
regulation will have only a “moderate” effect on innovation
30.  The vertical distance I1-I2 depicts 
this level of forgone innovation.   
If, on the other hand, the marginal productivity of R&D at the current pre-policy level is 
“high,” then price regulation could impose a very high cost in terms of forgone innovation.  This 
would be the case if production function f, which assumes constant returns to R&D, 
characterized pharmaceutical productivity at the margin.  The vertical distance I1-I3 depicts this 
cost.  
There are numerous complexities surrounding the productivity of R&D, and how it 
relates to the demand for innovative pharmaceuticals and investment in R&D itself.  However, 
the objective of the current discussion is only to highlight an important fact: A decline in R&D 
investment of between 23.4 and 32.7 percent, as estimated in this paper, is of only limited value 
in the absence of a fuller understanding of what this would mean for pharmaceutical innovation.  
While it is probable that that innovation would decline, by how much it would decline is not at 
all clear. 
Given the points just raised, it is now appropriate to consider the welfare implications 
that would be associated with this policy.  To do this it is necessary to consider two types of 
economic efficiency: static and dynamic.   
                                                 
29 The horizontal axis could be labeled new pharmaceuticals, but because of the considerable heterogeneity in new 
pharmaceuticals, some of which may not be new at all (i.e., “me-too” drugs), the more general variable, 
pharmaceutical innovation, was selected.  How to measure pharmaceutical innovation is of course a challenging 
question, but it is not relevant for the current discussion. 
30 More precisely, the fall in innovation will depend on the average productivity between the pre- and post-levels of 
R&D.  For small changes in R&D it may be sufficient to refer to the marginal productivity at the pre-policy level, 
but for large changes in R&D the average productivity between pre- and post-policy levels could significantly 
deviate from the marginal productivity at the pre-policy level.     19
The primary product of pharmaceutical R&D is new knowledge, and the transfer of new 
knowledge often occurs at very low costs
31.  From a static efficiency perspective—ignoring 
technological change and innovation, and focusing only on the optimal allocation of resources 
available in the present period—the socially optimal course of action would be to eliminate 
pharmaceutical patent protection all together.  This would allow competitive forces to drive 
pharmaceutical prices down to (or close to) marginal manufacturing costs.  
This eradication of intellectual property rights is not done for obvious reasons: it would 
eliminate all incentives to innovate.  Indeed, the average new pharmaceutical spends 12-14 years 
in development and costs hundreds of millions of dollars to develop and bring to market [52].  
Without the ability to price monopolistically through patent protection, firms would be unable to 
appropriate the rents from their innovations.  Dynamic efficiency, therefore, must also be taken 
into account when considering the welfare implications of this policy.  
While the regulation of pharmaceutical prices in the U.S. would certainly involve some 
gain in static efficiency, and some loss in dynamic efficiency, it is not clear what the net effect 
would be.  On the one hand, price regulation (or allowing drugs to be re-imported into the U.S. 
from abroad) would result in prices that are closer to marginal costs.  This would improve static 
efficiency.  On the other hand, as has been the focus of this paper, the regulation of 
pharmaceutical prices in the U.S. will reduce the incentives to innovate (and will restrict the 
funds used to finance R&D).   Therefore, the implications for dynamic efficiency must also be 
considered.  This will depend largely on the innovative productivity of R&D, or, as illustrated in 
Figure 2, the shape of the industry’s R&D production function.   
If at the current levels R&D marginal innovative productivity is “small,” then forgone 
innovation will also be “small.” If instead the marginal innovative productivity of R&D is 
“large,” then forgone pharmaceutical innovation will also be “large.”  Clearly then, from a social 
welfare perspective, the potential loss in dynamic efficiency from such a policy must be 
weighted against the potential gains in static efficiency. This tradeoff is illustrated in Figure 3. 
                                                 
31 Regarding this point, Arrow [53] has noted: “Information is a commodity with peculiar attributes, particularly 
embarrassing for the achievement of optimal allocation.  In the first place, any information obtained, say a new 
method of production, should, from the welfare point of view, be available free of charge (apart from the cost of 
transmitting information).  This insures optimal utilization of the information but of course provides no incentive for 
research…In a free enterprise economy, inventive activity is supported by using the invention to create property 
rights; precisely to the extent that it is successful, there is an underutilization of the information.”   20
To determine whether a policy regulating pharmaceutical prices in the U.S. is, on net, 
good or bad for social welfare, it is necessary to know where along the horizontal axis (which is 
measured in terms of the industry’s average pharmaceutical profit margin) we reside.  If the 
current position is point B, then it is possible that price regulation will be welfare enhancing, so 
long as the effect is not so great as to move industry profit margins below the level associated 
with minimum total social cost
32.  If instead society is currently at this minimum point, or to the 
left of it (i.e., point A), then the policy will unambiguously have a negative effect on social 
welfare.    
In sum, it is critical to put the results presented in this section into proper perspective, 
both because of the caveats associated with the results themselves and because of the uncertainty 
surrounding their implications for social welfare.  The prediction that pharmaceutical price 
regulation in the U.S will lead to a decline in industry R&D investment from between 23.4 to 





Using established R&D investment models from the literature, this paper has explored 
the possible links between pharmaceutical price regulation and firm R&D investment intensity.  
A unique fact has been employed to help identify these links: relative to the rest of the world, in 
the U.S., pharmaceutical prices are largely unregulated.   
Data from fourteen major pharmaceutical firms have been collected for the years 1994 to 
1997, and several models of the determinants of R&D investment were estimated.  The estimated 
models have shown, like earlier research on this subject, that expected profits and lagged cash 
flows are the principal determinants of firm R&D-to-sales ratios.   
It has then been argued that pharmaceutical price regulation influences R&D investment 
through both of these channels, resulting in an expected-profit effect and a cash-flow effect. The 
former effect influences R&D contemporaneously while the latter effect operates with a one-year 
lag.   
                                                 
32 Technically speaking, the policy could move industry margins below the minimum point and still be welfare 
enhancing: so long as margins were nor displaced too far below the minimum point, and the sum of static and   21
The empirical results from these models have then been used to simulate the effect of a 
hypothetical U.S. policy that regulates pharmaceutical prices.  This has been accomplished by 
assuming that the effect of such a policy would be to lower pre-tax pharmaceutical profit 
margins in the U.S. to the average level of profit margins observed in non-U.S. markets.  My 
simulation exercises have predicted that the effect of such a policy would be to reduce industry 
R&D investment intensity by between 23.4 and 32.7 percent.  
These predictions, it has been emphasized, are speculative for a number of reasons.   
However, they do appear reasonable and in accordance with economic theory.  Most importantly, 
I have underscored that from a social welfare perspective, the model’s predictions themselves are 
of only limited value.  An understanding of what this decline in R&D would mean for social 
welfare would require knowledge about the innovative productivity of the forgone R&D, as well 
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Table 1: The Determinants of R&D-to-Sales for Fourteen Firms, 1994-1997 
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Model F-Statistic 





















 Note: Intercepts and controls also included in equations. 
 *     Significant at the 0.05-level 
 **   Significant at the 0.01-level 








Table 2: Estimated Pharmaceutical Profit Margins in the U.S. and Abroad 








M   Adj. 
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0.497 0.105  0.533 








0.497 0.105  0.573 





0.465 0.138  0.565 
              Note:  
F
M for the fixed-effects model is simply the average of the fixed effects 
              *      Significant at the 0.10-level 










Table 3: Effect of Pharmaceutical Price Regulation in the U.S. on R&D Investment   
(Based Models E.1, E.2, E.4, E.5, and Sample Means) 






































Before New U.S. Policy Regulating Prices 
 
0.107 0.303  0.248 
1 Year After New U.S. Policy Regulating Prices
 
00.082 to 0.072  0.105  0.176 
∆(R&D Intensity) From U.S. Price Controls 
 






Decomposition of Decline in R&D Intensity by Effect: 
  
    
∆ (R&D Intensity) From Cash Flow Effect 
 
-0.011 to –0.021 
(-10.3% to –19.6%) 
-- -- 
∆ (R&D Intensity) From Expected Profit Effect 
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Figure 1: The Paths Through Which Pharmaceutical Price Regulation/Re-importation 
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Figure 3: The Tradeoff Between Static and Dynamic Efficiency Under a U.S. Policy 
Regulating Prescription Drug Prices 
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Decomposing Firm Pre-tax Pharmaceutical Profit Margins 
To illustrate how a firm’s pre-tax pharmaceutical profit margin can be decomposed into 
two components: a U.S. pre-tax profit margin and a non-U.S. pre-tax profit margin (i.e., a “free” 
market and a price-regulated market profit margin), I develop a simple model in which a firm 
produces and sells a portfolio of n pharmaceutical products in two separate markets: market R, 
which is a price-regulated market, and market F, which is a free market.  The firm’s marginal 
cost of production for product i is assumed to be constant and equal to i c . 
Assume that the price of the firm’s i
th product is
R
i p  and 
F
i p in markets R and F., 




i p p < for all i = 1 to n.  The quantities sold in each market 
are 
R
i q  and 
F
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Equation (A1) may be equivalently expressed in the following way: 
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Re-arranging terms in equation (A3) yields: 
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Inspection of the factors and terms in equation (A4) reveals the presence of the previously 
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Equation (A8) is thus identical to equation (5) from the main text.  It is important to 
emphasize that the derived results are contingent upon the separability of costs.  This seems to be 
a reasonable assumption; most pharmaceuticals are sold in both U.S. and non-U.S. markets and 
are produced in centralized manufacturing locations. They are then shipped to their final market 
destinations. Costs such as marketing expenses, however, may be greater in the U.S. than 
elsewhere in the world; this would be the case, for example, if direct-to-consumer advertising 
spending were proportionately greater in the U.S. relative to the rest of the world.  Importantly, 
however, this would tend to buffer any differences in pre-tax profit margins across U.S. and non-
U.S. markets.  Finally, the assumption about constant marginal costs does not represent a threat 
to the model, it just provides for greater algebraic convenience.  Thus, the constant marginal 
cost,  i c , could be replaced with a measure of the average cost of production. The variables 
R M and 
F M  are, after all, averages themselves.  Vernon [54] discusses these assumptions in 
greater detail.   32
 
 
Descriptive Statistics on Key Model Variables and Other Results 
 






























Mean  0.107 0.248 0.303 0.494 0.544 
Median  0.093 0.238 0.319 0.466 0.565 
Range 0.050-0.263  0.115-0.506  0.050-0.724 0.070-0.894 0.105-1.000 







TableA2: Estimated Pharmaceutical Profit Margins in the U.S. and Abroad 
(White Standard Errors in Parenthesis) 
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0.608 0.05  0.556 
         *** Significant at the 0.001-level or better 
 